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


Study No. 10

Study of U.S. Public Views on the Ukraine War

and on Race, Ethnicity, and Religion


Shibley Telhami and Stella Rouse, Principal Investigators



Most Republicans Support Declaring the United States a Christian Nation... Even as Most Also Say This Would Violate the U.S. Constitution


Q. Would you favor or oppose the United States officially declaring the United States to be a Christian nation?

Q. Do you think the U.S. constitution would or would not allow the U.S. government to declare the United States a Christian nation?



Jewish Presidential Candidates Would Face The Lowest Public Opposition, Closely Followed by Catholic and Mainline Protestant Candidates

Q. Assuming that you agree with the general positions of the presidential candidates on issues that are important to you,




Study of U.S. Public Views on the Ukraine War and on Race, Ethnicity, and Religion

The Critical Issues Poll has examined domestic and international issues central to policy discourse since 2016, when it was first established. It has reported on trends in American attitudes on a variety of top issues throughout the years, from policy decisions, to race relations, to responses to conflicts, and the prioritization of issues. This report focuses on two of the top issues in American public discourse: the Ukraine war and attitudes toward race, ethnicity, and religion. Since March 2022, one month after Russia invaded Ukraine, the Critical Issues Poll has fielded four polls on public attitude toward the U.S. response, studying the trends as the war develops. In addition, in May 2022, nearly two years since the murder of George Floyd and the subsequent Black Lives Matter Demonstrations, the Critical Issues Poll asked Americans their views on race, ethnicity, and religious discrimination in the United States. In this report, we first analyze the trends on the Ukraine war, including diving into the demographic breakdown of how Americans want the U.S. to respond and what costs they are willing to endure. We then shift to look at how Americans respond to questions on race, ethnicity, and religion, studying how much perceived discrimination different racial and ethnic groups reported facing, the generational divide on perceived discrimination against different races and ethnicities, and the role of religion in American politics.


Trends in American Public Attitudes on the Ukraine War

In March 2022, we <u>reported</u> that there was strong bipartisan support for U.S. action to support Ukraine after the Russian invasion. The shock of the invasion narrowed the divide between Republicans and Democrats on issues around how the U.S. should respond, although attitudes towards President Joe Biden were still a differentiating factor across the partisan divide. In a followup poll <u>conducted in May</u>, we saw a slight increase in partisanship around U.S. involvement in Ukraine. Republicans were less willing to bear the cost of helping Ukraine and less supportive of U.S. involvement in Ukraine. In one survey experiment, <u>when asked</u> about the same actions taken by the "Biden Administration" versus by the "United States", Republicans were less supportive when Biden was mentioned. Despite this increase in partisanship, a majority of Americans were still willing to endure higher energy costs and increased inflation in order to help Ukraine. In June and <u>October</u>, we conducted two more polls on this issue and found that a majority of Americans were still prepared to pay higher energy costs and endure increased inflation as a result of helping Ukraine.




In fact, the American public's willingness to endure increased inflation as a result of supporting Ukraine slightly rose after the drop in May. For higher energy costs, the change in preparedness remained relatively the same and within the margin of error. While preparedness to pay higher energy costs and to see increased inflation did not return to the March levels, the preparedness to risk the lives of U.S. troops surpassed the March level by 6 points.

Consistent with our previous findings, we continued to see a partisan divide in support for enduring costs to help Ukraine. However, despite recent anti-Ukraine rhetoric from <u>prominent Republicans</u>, our October poll, conducted one month before the midterm elections, showed an increase in support for Ukraine among Republicans. Significantly, Republicans were 4 points more prepared to see higher energy costs and 5 points more prepared to see increased inflation in October compared to June. In comparison, Democrats were only 2 points more prepared for either cost.




However, the biggest change was that Republicans were 13 points more prepared to risk the lives of U.S. troops in October compared to June. Nonetheless, a majority of Americans (62%) were still unwilling to risk the lives of U.S. troops and Republicans still remained overwhelmingly opposed to this cost.



More Americans See Ukraine as Winning the War – and that's a likely reason for the robust support for Ukraine

Compared to June, Americans were much more confident that Ukraine is winning the war against Russia in October. In addition, those who said Russia was failing or Ukraine was succeeding were more willing to endure higher energy costs or increased inflation. While, in general, Americans were prepared to see higher energy costs (60%) and increased inflation (57%), among those who said Russia was failing in its efforts, the willingness to endure these sacrifices was higher—67% were willing to pay higher energy costs and 60% were prepared to endure increased inflation. However, those who saw Russia as failing were less likely to be willing to risk the lives of U.S. troops. Thirty-eight percent of all respondents were prepared to risk the lives of U.S. troops compared to 32% of those who said Russia was failing. It appears that Americans are more willing to endure personal economic costs for the sake of the war and Ukraine's increased success, but less willing to risk U.S. lives.


Americans are More Confident that Russia is Failing and Ukraine is Succeeding



Americans Support Many Actions to Aid Ukraine but Sending Troops is Not One of Them

Consistent with our previous findings, a majority of Americans were still not willing to risk the lives of U.S. troops, and according to the trends from March to June (the last time we asked this question), only a minority said the U.S. should send military troops (39% in June). While Americans still overwhelmingly supported economic sanctions on Russia (87% in June), support for sending military aid to Ukraine has declined since May to June (down 7 points from 82% to 75%). Enforcing a no-fly zone increased slightly in June (up 6 points from 59% to 65%). Although, as we noted in the last report, when Americans were informed of what a no-fly zone entails, they were less supportive than when asked without context. Less Americans were supportive of attempts to find a diplomatic

solution to the war since May (90% to 86%), but it still ranked highly among actions Americans support as ways for the U.S. to engage in the war effort.



Americans Continue to Support Helping Ukraine

Q. Which of the following should the U.S. do if the Russian invasion of Ukraine persists?

In June, Americans who believed Russia was failing (29%) and Ukraine was winning (27%) were more supportive of actions to support Ukraine. Specifically, Americans who saw Ukraine as succeeding were much more likely (92%) to support supplying Ukraine with military equipment than those who saw it as failing (56%) or as neither succeeding nor failing (76%). In addition, Americans who saw Ukraine as succeeding or Russia as failing were more supportive of sending troops to Ukraine (49% and 46% respectively), although a majority of those who saw Ukraine as succeeding or Russia as failing (51% and 54% respectively) still did not support the action.

Young Americans Support Costs but are Less Optimistic About Ukraine

In both June and October, younger Americans were more tolerant of costs, including risking lives of U.S. troops. In June, 66% of American under the age of 35 were prepared for higher energy costs (compared to 61% of Americans 35 years or older and 62% overall) and 65% were prepared for increased inflation (compared to 55% of 35 years or older and 58% overall). Thirty-six percent of young Americans were willing to risk the lives of U.S. troops compared to 31% of Americans aged 35 years or older and 32% of all respondents. In October, support from young Americans grew. Seventy-two percent of Americans under 30 were prepared for higher energy costs (compared to 58% of Americans aged 30 or older and 61% overall), 71% for increased inflation (compared to 54% of Americans 30 years or older and 57% overall) and 48% for risking the lives of U.S. troops (compared to 37% of Americans 30 years or older and 38% overall). The gap between young Americans and older Americans in their willingness to pay the price for Ukraine grew from June to October. Whereas in June there was a 5-point difference between young and older Americans on preparedness for higher energy and a 10-point difference on increased inflation, in October that

jumped to a 14-point and 17-point difference, respectively. On willingness to risk the lives of U.S. troops, the difference between young Americans and older Americans in June was 5 points but in October it was 11 points.

Notably however, according to the June poll, even though young Americans were more prepared to risk the lives of U.S. troops, they did not support sending troops to Ukraine. Whereas 39% of Americans overall and 40% of Americans 35 years and older supported sending troops to help Ukraine, only 34% of young Americans supported the same action.

It may be that young Americans were more pessimistic about Ukraine's chances. In October, only 40% of Americans under 30 saw Russia as failing, compared to 50% of Americans aged 30 or older and 48% overall. In addition, only 30% of young Americans saw Ukraine as succeeding, compared to 45% of Americans 30 years and older and 43% of Americans overall.


Americans Most Likely to be Impacted by the Economic Costs of Ukraine Remain Supportive


In June those who made under \$100K were less willing to endure higher energy costs and increased inflation but in October, those making under \$100K a year were more willing than those who make over \$100K a year. In June, 60% and 57% of those who made under \$100K a year were willing to endure higher energy costs and increased inflation, respectively. Compared to the 67% and 60% who make over \$100K. In comparison, according to the October data, 63% of those who make under \$100K a year said they were willing to endure higher energy costs and 59% were willing to see increased inflation, compared to 54% and 50% of those who make over \$100K, respectively. In October, those who made under \$100K were also more likely to rank inflation as a top priority (70% ranked it in their top three priorities) for the 2022 Midterm election. However, despite this, a majority still said they were willing to endure higher energy prices (58%) and increased inflation (57%).

Examining American Public Attitudes on Race, Ethnicity, and Religion,


Attitudes on Race and Ethnicity

In July, we reported on perceptions of discrimination in the United States in an article featured in <u>The Conversation</u>. The article was based on data from our May 2022 University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll. The poll revealed that nearly a third of White Americans say they have seen "a lot more" discrimination against White people in the last five years, while also seeing relatively less discrimination against most other racial groups. This effect was far stronger among Republican than Democratic respondents. Similarly, Black, and Latino respondents viewed their respective groups as having experienced 'a lot more' discrimination in the last five years than was perceived by all groups. However, White Americans viewed only their respective identity - white- and Christians as having experienced 'a lot more' discrimination than was perceived by all groups. Black and Latino respondents, on the other hand, were more likely to view an increased level of discrimination for Muslim, Asian, Latino, Jewish (among Black respondents), and Black Americans.







These effects were driven by Republicans, who were five and ten times more likely than Democrats to view Christian and White Americans, respectively, as having experienced 'a lot more' discrimination. Regardless, we further found that White Democrats were less likely to view other groups as having experienced 'a lot' more discrimination compared to Black and Latino Democrats, but White Democrats are still closer to their fellow Democrats than to White Republicans.




Percent of Americans Who See 'A Lot More' Discrimination Against Groups

In the same poll, we asked about perceptions of different groups in their contributions to American society. Large majorities of Democrats from various racial backgrounds stated they believed that all the groups mentioned strengthened American society. Across the board, White, Black, and Latino respondents held favorable views towards Asian Americans. When accounting for the ratio of favorable (strengthen American society) to unfavorable (weaken American society) views, Asian and Jewish Americans were viewed significantly more favorably compared to Black, Latino, and Muslim Americans. However, Muslim Americans were still viewed significantly more unfavorably compared to Black and Latino Americans across all respondents.









Would you say that, in general, the number of Black Americans:


Would you say that, in general, the number of Latino Americans:





Would you say that, in general, the number of Muslim Americans:

Would you say that, in general, the number of Jewish Americans:




For White Democrats, responses affirming the benefit of various groups to American society ranged from 67% for Muslim Americans, to 79% for Asian Americans. At the same time, White Republican perceptions were far less positive, with similarly positive responses ranging from 19% for Muslim Americans, to 52% for Asian Americans. White, Black, and Latino Democrats were generally more likely to believe that any of the listed groups strengthened American society compared to their White, Black, and Latino Republican counterparts. However, there were two instances where Republicans viewed a particular group as more beneficial to American society, in contrast to their

Democratic counterparts. When asked whether Asian Americans strengthened American society, more Black Republicans (77%) compared to Black Democrats (54%) responded positively. Similarly, 52% of Black Democrats compared to 71% of Black Republicans responded that Jewish Americans strengthen American society. However, due to the relatively small sample size of Black Republicans in our poll, we are careful to not draw strong conclusions.


The poll results further highlighted how party affiliation has become a type of identity itself, reflecting one's place in American society. Notably, we found that groups who have historically experienced high levels of discrimination held higher levels of empathy for other minority groups.

We also examined how generational differences impact cross-party perceptions on the value of certain groups in strengthening American society. Here, respondents were similarly distinguished by party affiliation, but also by generational grouping rather than race, ethnicity, or religion. Respondents were sorted into one of three generational groupings: the Silent/Baby Boomer generations, Generation X, and Millennial/Generation Z.

We found that while Republicans were less likely to view any given minority group as strengthening American society, this belief was strongest for Republicans who are members of Silent/Baby Boomer group, and the Millennial/Generation Z group. Moving from the Silent/Baby Boomer group to Generation X, positive attitudes towards the value of various minority groups to American society increased for both Democrats and Republicans. However, while this trend of greater acceptance of diversity continued onto the Millennial/Generation Z group for Democrats, it decreased in the transition to Millennial/Generation Z Republicans. Notably, the biggest increase in levels of acceptance of diversity among Democrats came in the jump between Generation X to Millennial/Generation Z.



Would you say that, in general, the number of Asian Americans:



Would you say that, in general, the number of African Americans:


Have No Impact


Don't Know

Weaken American Society

Strengthen American Society


Would you say that, in general, the number of Latino Americans:






Would you say that, in general, the number of Muslim Americans:

Would you say that, in general, the number of Jewish Americans:



Gaps in understanding of the long-term effects of historical marginalization

Looking deeper into attitudes about race, ethnicity, and diversity, we asked respondents how much they agreed or disagreed with several questions relating to racial justice. Echoing our findings that showed an "empathy gap" between Republicans and Democrats regarding the prevalence of discrimination, the results below demonstrate that there may be an "understanding gap" as well. Democrats were significantly less likely to oppose race-based affirmative action: 48% of Democrats voiced support for affirmative action, compared to only 6% of Republicans. Furthermore, Democrats were far more likely (82%) than Republicans (16%) to agree that generations of slavery and discrimination have made it difficult for Black Americans to work their way out of the lower class. Republicans (57%) were far more likely than Democrats (12%) to attribute this to a lack of work ethic or effort among African Americans.




Examining generational groupings instead of partisanship, we found that as expected, younger generations were more likely to support race-based affirmative action. Likewise, younger generations were more progressive in their attitudes about the conditions of Black Americans. Younger generations were more likely to attribute Black socioeconomic status to generations of slavery and discrimination, rather than to a lack of work ethic or effort.

Many minorities have overcome prejudice and worked their way up. Every group should do the same without any special favors. Strongly Agree Somewhat Agree Neither Agree nor Disagree Somewhat Disagree Strongly Disagree 51% 34% 38% 24% 27% 21% 15% 18% 19% 23% 12% 15% 12% 24% 10% 19% 13% 9% 11% 5% the state of the s Silent Generation/Baby Boomer Generation X Millennials/Generation Z Total Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Black Americans to work their way out of the lower class 41% 29% 25% 31% 28% 29% 27% 18% 21% 11% 19% 21% 21% 14% 18% 8% 12% 15% 8% 5% Silent Generation/Baby Boomer Generation X Millennials/Generation Z Total It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Black Americans would only try harder, they could be just as well off as White Americans. 45% 34% 17% 17% 18% 14% 25% 17% 22% 22% 15% 24% 10% 16% 15% 14% 14% 19% 19% 14% 1 Silent Generation/Baby Boomer Generation X Millennials/Generation Z Total

How Much Do You Agree or Disagree with the Following Statements:


Most Republicans, Including Three-Quarters of Republican Evangelicals, Support Declaring the U.S. a Christian Nation Even Though a Majority Say It Violates the Constitution

In a <u>Politico</u> article we published in September, using the same May 2022 Critical Issues Poll data, we found that a majority of Republicans (57%) and Democrats (81%) were aware that it would be unconstitutional for the United States to be officially declared a Christian nation. Indeed, Congress can neither establish nor prohibit the practice of a religion per the First Amendment. We followed up this question by asking "Would you favor or oppose the United States officially declaring the United States to be a Christian nation?" Overall, a majority of Republicans (61%) responded that they would favor such a declaration, compared to only 17% of Democrats.





Percentage of Respondents Who Believe the Constitution Would or Would Not

Percentage of Respondents in Favor of or Opposed to Declaring the U.S. a Christian Nation




The greatest support for declaring the United States a Christian nation came from older generations, Republicans, and those who identify themselves as Evangelical or born-again Christians. While Evangelical Christians and born-again Christians favored the declaration by 74% and 68% respectively, Republican Evangelical Christians and Born-again Christians supported the declaration by 78% and 79%, respectively. These results stand in contrast to their Democratic Evangelical and born-again Christian counterparts, who supported the declaration by 57% and 53%, respectively.





Sorting respondents by generational grouping, we found that younger generations were less likely to support such a declaration. Between the Silent/Baby Boomer generations to Generation X, support dropped by a third, from 51% to 34%. This trend continued onto the youngest generations---Millennial/Generation Z, with support further dropping from 34% to 26%.


Generational Divide of Americans Who Favor or Opposed Declaring the U.S. a Christian Nation




Q. Would you favor or oppose the United States officially declaring the United States to be a Christian nation?

Perceptions of Muslims in America


Shifting attention towards Islam, we found that unlike attitudes towards the Muslim people, attitudes towards the Muslim religion has not improved at a similar rate between 2015 to 2022. This is consistent with a <u>previous finding</u> that Americans differentiate between Muslim people and Islam, which is an abstract idea rather than another human being.






As noted in an earlier <u>Washington Post</u> article, the upward trend of favorable views toward Muslims and Islam starting in 2016 was mostly partisan and largely a backlash against President Donald Trump's rhetoric about Muslims. Multiple polls conducted starting with Trump's presidential campaign in 2015-2016 and ending in May 2022 showed a increase in the favorable views of Islam and Muslims coming mostly from Democrats and Independents.


Separating respondents by race, we found that favorability towards the Muslim religion was lowest among White Americans (46%), and highest among Black Americans (72%). We further found that Republicans held more negative attitudes towards Islam compared to Democrats. When asked about favorability towards the Muslim religion, 69% of Republicans and 29% of Democrats responded unfavorably.



What is your attitude toward the Muslim religion?

One implication arising from these results is that we expected Republican respondents to hold relatively more negative views on the compatibility of Islam with Western traditions. Indeed, we found that about four times as many Republicans (44%) compared to Democrats (11%) responded that Islamic and Western religious and social traditions were incompatible with each other.






Which position is closer to yours? "Islamic & Western religious and social traditions are mutually incompatible" or "Most people in the West & the Islamic world have similar needs & wants, so it is possible to find common ground"

Some of this effect may be explained by levels of familiarity with Muslims in one's own life, as increasing levels of familiarity are correlated with a lower tendency to view Islamic and Western traditions as being incompatible with each other. We found that increased familiarity with Muslims in one's life was correlated to a higher tendency to believe that common ground can be found between people in the West and the Islamic world.


However, differences in respondents' familiarity with Muslims in their lives across party lines were relatively small. It should also be noted here that the question asking respondents about their familiarity with Muslims comes after the respondent was asked about their attitudes towards the Muslim people and religion, so there may be a certain degree of social desirability bias influencing responses.



In your life, how familiar are you with people who are Muslim?

Electability of Presidential Candidates Based on Their Religious Identity

The totality of these attitudes across racial and partisan groups is important to a better understanding of how they impact representation at all levels of government. We asked respondents the following question: "Assuming that you agree with the general positions of the presidential candidates on issues that are important to you, would you vote for that candidate if he/she were [a member of one of ten different religious groups]?" We found that the religious identities with the greatest levels of support in a national leader were for Judaism (77%), Catholicism (74%), Mainline Protestantism (65%), and Evangelical Christianity (61%). Meanwhile, the religious identities with the highest levels of disapproval were for Atheism (34%), Islam (26%), and Mormonism (23%).




Percent of Those Who Opposed Voting for a Presidential Candidate Based on Their Religious Identity

% opposed to voting for each candidate (assuming the general position of the candidate aligned with the respondent)

Notably, several religious identities resulted in splits in approval across parties. Democrats were significantly less likely than Republicans to approve of potential candidates who were Evangelical Christians. Meanwhile, Democrats were significantly more likely to approve of potential candidates who were Muslim, Hindu, Agnostic, or Atheist.

Willingness to vote for presidential candidates based on their religious identity

Q. Assuming that you agree with the general position of the presidential candidates on issues that are important to you, would you vote for the candidate if



Conclusion: Looking Ahead

The results analyzing the attitudes toward the Ukraine war and toward race, ethnicity and religion are part of ongoing research that the Critical Issues Poll will continue to track on American public attitude on this issue. As highlighted in this report, many Americans perceive a lot of discrimination against the various racial, ethnic, and religious groups to which they belong. However, we also found trends of declining negative perceptions of these various groups. To further understand these findings, we intend to measure the difference between the vertical expansion of racism and prejudice such as the intensity of racist incidents, with the horizontal spread of these attitudes to a larger number of Americans. So far, it is <u>notable</u> that the increase in reported racist incidents toward various racial, ethnic, and religious groups in America do not appear to have been accompanied by an increase in the number of people who hold racist views. As for the war in Ukraine, American public opinion remains strong and Americans have become increasingly confident that Ukraine will succeed in defending its sovereignty and democracy against the Russian invasion. However, this has not been the only threat to global democracy in recent years and the Critical Issues Poll continues to study American public opinion on threats to democracy within the U.S. and globally.

Methodology

March 2022

The survey was carried out March 16-28, 2022 online from a nationally representative sample of Nielsen Scarborough's probability-based panel, originally recruited by mail and telephone using a random sample of adults provided by Survey Sampling International. The poll was conducted among a national poll of 1,320 respondents, with a margin of error of +/- 2.7%. Overall, the sample was adjusted to reflect population estimates (Scarborough USA+/Gallup) for Americans. The survey variables balanced through weighting were: age, gender, race/ethnicity, household income, level of education, census regional division, and political party affiliation. Questionnaire with Results

May 2022

The survey was carried out May 6-16, 2022 online from a nationally representative sample of Nielsen Scarborough's probability-based panel, originally recruited by mail and telephone using a random sample of adults provided by Survey Sampling International. The poll was conducted among a national poll of 2091 respondents, with a margin of error of +/- 2.14%. Overall, the sample was adjusted to reflect population estimates (Scarborough USA+/Gallup) for Americans. The survey variables balanced through weighting were: age, gender, race/ethnicity, household income, level of education, census regional division, and political party affiliation. Race, Ethnicity, and Religion Questionnaire with Results Ukraine War Questionnaire with Results

June 2022


The survey was carried out June 22-28, 2022 online from a nationally representative sample of Nielsen Scarborough's probability-based panel, originally recruited by mail and telephone using a random sample of adults provided by Survey Sampling International. The poll was conducted among a national poll of 2208 respondents, with a margin of error of +/- 2.09%. Overall, the sample was adjusted to reflect population estimates (Scarborough USA+/Gallup) for Americans. The survey variables balanced through weighting were: age, gender, race/ethnicity, household income, level of education, census regional division, and political party affiliation. Questionnaire with Results

October 2022

This University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll was fielded by SSRS on its Opinion Panel Omnibus platform. Data collection was conducted October 7-10, 2022 among a sample of 1,029 respondents aged 18 or older living in the United States from the SSRS probability-based panel. The survey was conducted online (n=999) and via telephone (n=30, for non-Internet and Internet-reluctant respondents) and administered in English. The margin of error for total respondents is +/-3.4 percentage points at the 95% confidence level. Members of the delivered nationally representative sample are recruited randomly based on nationally representative Address Based Sample (ABS) design (including Hawaii and Alaska). ABS sample is drawn from the Delivery Sequence File (DSF)

maintained by the U.S. Postal Service. Population coverage of the DSF is in the 98%-99% range. SSRS Opinion Panel data is weighted to be representative of the entire residential adult population in the United States. The first step in the weighting process is the application of a base weight that accounts for the ABS sample design and the within-household sampling of one adult. Data were weighted to distributions of: sex by age, sex by education, age by education, race/ethnicity, census region, civic engagement, population density, frequency of internet use, voter status, religious affiliation, and party ID. Benchmark distributions are obtained from the most recently available data from sources such as the Current Population Survey (CPS), the American Community Survey (ACS), the Pew Research Center's National Public Opinion Reference Survey (NPORS), and the Aristotle Registered Voter Database. The design effect is 1.23. Questionnaire with Results

Leadership for the Critical Issues Poll



Shibley Telhami is the Anwar Sadat Professor for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland, College Park, and Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. Before coming to the University of Maryland, he taught at several universities, including the University of California at Berkeley, where he received his doctorate in political science. He has authored and edited numerous books, including two forthcoming books: The One State Reality: What is Israel/Palestine? (co-edited, Cornell University Press); and Peace Derailed: Obama, Trump, Biden, and the Decline of Diplomacy on Israel/Palestine, 2011-2022 (co-authored). Professor Telhami has advised every U.S. administration from

George H.W. Bush to Barack Obama. He was selected by the Carnegie Corporation of New York along with the New York Times as one of the "Great Immigrants" for 2013. In 2022, he was listed by the Washingtonian Magazine as one of the most influential people on foreign affairs. He is also a recipient of the University of Maryland's Honors College Outstanding Faculty Award, The University of Maryland Distinguished Service Award, and the University of Maryland Distinguished Scholar-Teacher Award.



Stella Rouse is a professor in the Department of Government and Politics. Professor Rouse earned her Ph.D. from Louisiana State University in 2008. In 2010, she was a visiting scholar at the Center for the Study of Race, Ethnicity and Gender in the Social Sciences (REGSS) at Duke University as a Ford Foundation Post-Doctoral Fellow. Rouse's first book, Latinos in the Legislative Process: Interests and Influence, published by Cambridge University Press, was named by Huffington Post as one of the "Best Political Science Books of 2013." Her second

book, The Politics of Millennials: Political Beliefs and Policy Preferences of America's Most Diverse Generation, with Ashley D. Ross, was published in August 2018. Her third book, titled "Citizens of the World: Political Engagement and Policy Attitudes of Millennials across the Globe," with Jared McDonald, Richard N. Engstrom, Michael J. Hanmer, Roberto Gonzàlez, Siugmin Lay, and Daniel Miranda, was published by Oxford University Press in 2022.

Analyst: John Derks, Doctoral Student in the Department of Government and Politics

Coordinator and Analyst: Kirsten Langlois, Program Coordinator and Executive Assistant for the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development; Coordinator for the University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll