




Trends in Prejudice Toward Jews and Muslims

Compared to Other Racial, Religious, and Ethnic Groups, 2026

Shibley Telhami, Principal Investigator


Perceived Prejudice Highest Toward Muslim and Jewish Americans

Q. Compared to 5 years ago and based on your own experience, including interactions with others, how much racial/ethnic/religious prejudice (such as statements that reveal prejudice against a person because of their race, ethnicity, or religion), if any, would you say exists against each of the following groups in the U.S. today? (Those who said "A lot more" / "A little more")




Opposition to a Muslim Presidential Candidate Is Highest of Any Group

Q. Assuming that you agree with the general positions of the presidential candidates on issues that are important to you, would you vote for that candidate if he/she were: (Those who said "No")




Muslims, Followed by Jews, Viewed as Least Likely to Strengthen American Society

Q. Would you say that, in general, the number of: (Those that said "strengthen American society")



Favorability Toward Muslims/Islam Declined Most Among Republicans

Q. What is your attitude about each of the following? (Those that said "Somewhat Favorable" / "Very Favorable")



Favorability Toward Jews/Judaism Much Higher Than Muslims/Islam, but Declining

Q. What is your attitude about each of the following? (Those that said "Somewhat Favorable" / "Very Favorable")




Table of Contents

I.	Introduction	Page 2
II.	Perceptions of Incidents of Prejudice Toward Jews and Muslims	Page 3
	Favorability Toward Jews, Judaism, Muslims, and Islam	Page 3
	Tracking Perceptions of Incidents of Prejudice Toward Jews and Muslims, 2022–2026	Page 9
	Measuring Opposition to Muslim and Jewish Presidential Candidates	Page 11
	Perceptions of Contributions of Muslims and Jews to American Society	Page 15
III.	Prejudice Toward Other Racial, Religious, and Ethnic Groups	Page 17
IV.	Trends in U.S. Public Attitudes Toward Antisemitism, 2022–2026	Page 23
V.	Public Self-Censorship When Speaking About the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Compared With the Russia-Ukraine Conflict	Page 32
VI.	Critical Issues Poll Leadership and Staff	Page 40

I. Introduction

The University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll (CIP) has undertaken a three-year project that examines attitudes toward racial, ethnic, and religious groups in the United States, with particular attention to attitudes toward Jews and Muslims. This work builds on several years of polling by the director of the CIP, Professor Shibley Telhami, including research tracking American public attitudes toward Islam and Muslims since 2015, as well as broader research examining prejudice toward racial, ethnic, and religious groups. The [latest poll](#) on these issues, released in this study, was taken in July 2026 with SSRS.

Together, this research seeks to understand and distinguish between two dimensions of prejudice: its horizontal spread, or the extent to which prejudice becomes more widespread across the population, and its vertical spread, or the extent to which prejudice becomes more intense, which could occur even without horizontal spread, typically measured by the number of observed incidents of prejudice.

There is evidence of an increase in reported incidents of prejudice against Jews and Muslims in recent years, based on official government tracking. According to [FBI data](#), from 2022 to 2025, reported anti-Jewish hate-crime incidents increased by 29%, anti-Islamic incidents by 32%, and anti-Arab incidents by 12%. In our own polling, however, we provide an indirect measure of the vertical spread of prejudice by examining how Americans perceive changes in the incidence of prejudice. Beginning in 2022, we have asked respondents whether, based on their own experiences and interactions with others, they perceive more or less racial, ethnic, or religious prejudice against particular groups than they did five years earlier. In the latest survey, for example, a majority of Americans perceived more prejudice against both Muslim Americans and Jewish Americans than five years ago—more than for any other ethnic, racial, or religious group in our study, including Latino, Black, White, Asian, and Christian Americans.

The focus of this report, however, is primarily on the horizontal spread of prejudice. Our polling directly measures attitudes toward different racial, ethnic, and religious groups, allowing us to examine the extent to which prejudicial attitudes are held across the American population and how those attitudes have changed over time. We do not directly measure the occurrence or severity of individual incidents of prejudice. Instead, our question about perceptions of incidents provides an indirect measure of the vertical dimension in probing how Americans perceive the prevalence of prejudice in their society.

In addition to tracking the prevalence of prejudice, this report also measures change in how Americans define antisemitism and the extent to which they differentiate attitudes against Jews and Judaism from attitudes against Israel and Zionism. We have probed

this issue in several polls in the past, including before October 7, 2023, and are thus able to track changes over time.

Finally, this report includes an assessment of change over time in the degree to which Americans feel the need to self-censor when they speak about the Israeli-Palestinian issue outside their homes, compared to the degree to which they feel the need to self-censor when speaking about the Russia-Ukraine issue.

II. Perceptions of Incidents of Prejudice Toward Jews and Muslims


Favorability Toward Jews, Judaism, Muslims, and Islam

We asked respondents about their attitudes toward Jews and Judaism, as well as toward Muslims and Islam. Overall, favorable views of Jews and Judaism were substantially more common than favorable views of Muslims and Islam. Eighty percent of respondents held favorable views of Jews, including 86% of Republicans, 82% of Democrats, and 76% of independents. Favorability toward Judaism was somewhat lower, at 72% overall, including 77% of Republicans, 75% of Democrats, and 67% of independents.

By comparison, 57% of respondents have favorable views of Muslims—23 percentage points lower than favorability toward Jews. Favorable views of Muslims were reported by 33% of Republicans, 77% of Democrats, and 62% of independents. Favorability toward Islam was even lower, with only 43% of respondents holding favorable views, including 19% of Republicans, 66% of Democrats, and 44% of independents. The partisan gap was particularly pronounced in views on Islam: favorability among Democrats was more than three times that of Republicans.

Favorability Toward Jews and Judaism Significantly Higher Than Toward Muslims and Islam

Q. What is your attitude about each of the following?




Source: University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll fielded with SSRS July 20 to July 26, 2026, among 1,206 US adults with a margin of error of +/- 3 percentage points.

Since July 2024, favorability toward Jews, Judaism, Muslims, and Islam has declined overall, but with notable partisan differences. Favorability toward Jews declined by 5 percentage points, from 85% to 80%. Among Republicans, favorability declined by 3 percentage points, from 89% to 86%, and among Democrats, by 4 percentage points, from 86% to 82%. Over the same period, favorability toward Muslims declined by 7 percentage points overall, from 64% in 2024 to 57% in 2026; the decline was particularly pronounced among Republicans, at 13 percentage points, while favorability among Democrats declined by only 3 percentage points.

Favorability toward Judaism declined by 5 percentage points overall, from 77% to 72%. Among Republicans, favorability fell 10 percentage points, from 87% to 77%. Among Democrats, favorability increased from 74% to 75%. Following a similar pattern, favorability toward Islam decreased by 5 percentage points overall, from 48% to 43%. Among Republicans, it declined 14 percentage points, from 33% to 19%, while Democrats' favorability increased from 59% to 66%.

Republicans' Favorable Views of Muslims and Islam Are Declining

Q. What is your attitude about each of the following?




Source: University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll fielded with SSRS July 20 to July 26, 2026, among 1,206 US adults with a margin of error of +/- 3 percentage points.

Our Critical Issues Poll began collecting data on attitudes toward Muslims and Islam in November 2015, allowing for a decade of data tracking the shift in the public's favorability. Favorability toward Muslims climbed between November 2015 and April 2017, increasing by 25 percentage points, from 46% to 71%, before declining to 66% in November 2017. Favorability reached a high of 78% in both March 2021 and May 2022. Since then, however, favorability has steadily declined to 57%.

Similarly, when tracking favorable attitudes toward Islam, we observe an increase from 37% in November 2015 to a high of 57% in March 2021, before a decline to 43% in the latest survey. Since its peak in 2021, favorability toward Islam has declined by 14 percentage points.

Since 2021, Favorable Attitudes Toward Muslims and Islam Are Declining

Q. What is your attitude about each of the following?




Favorable views of Muslims have diverged along partisan lines over the tracking period. In November 2015, 67% of Democrats and 41% of Republicans reported favorable views of Muslims. Among Republicans, favorability reached a high of 70% in March 2021 before declining by 37 percentage points to 33% in the latest survey. Among Democrats, favorability reached a high of 92% in May 2022 before declining by 15 percentage points to 77% in the latest survey. Despite these recent declines among both groups, favorable views of Muslims have increased among Democrats and decreased among Republicans compared with November 2015.

Similarly, favorable views of Islam increased among Democrats, from 51% in November 2015 to 66% in 2026. Among Republicans, favorability declined from 27% to 19% over the same period, reaching its lowest point in more than a decade. Republican favorability toward Islam reached a high of 40% in March 2021 at the same time that Republican favorability toward Muslims reached its peak.

Republicans' Views of Islam and Muslims Lowest in Over a Decade

Q. What is your attitude about each of the following?



Source: University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll fielded with SSRS July 20 to July 26, 2026, among 1,206 US adults with a margin of error of +/- 3 percentage points.


Age is an important factor in respondents' views of both Jews and Muslims, but the patterns differ sharply by group. Younger respondents are more favorable toward Muslims and Islam and less favorable toward Jews and Judaism than older respondents. Nearly two-thirds of respondents ages 18–34 (65%) reported favorable views of Muslims, compared with 54% of respondents ages 35 and older. The age difference is particularly pronounced among Republicans: 51% of Republicans ages 18–34 reported favorable views of Muslims, compared with 29% of Republicans ages 35 and older. Among Democrats, views differed less across age groups, with 79% of young Democrats and 76% of Democrats ages 35 and older reporting favorable views. Similarly, 66% of Democrats had favorable views of Islam, including 65% of Democrats ages 18–34 and 67% of those ages 35 and older. Among Republicans, younger respondents were somewhat more favorable toward Islam, with 24% of Republicans ages 18–34 reporting favorable views, compared with 18% of Republicans ages 35 and older.

By contrast, 69% of respondents ages 18–34 reported favorable views of Jews, compared with 84% of those ages 35 and older—a 15-percentage-point gap. Among younger respondents, 72% of Republicans and 73% of Democrats reported favorable views of Jews. Among respondents ages 35 and older, favorability increased to 89% among Republicans and 86% among Democrats. Similarly, 60% of respondents ages 18–34 reported favorable views of Judaism, compared with 77% of respondents ages 35 and older.

older—a 17-percentage-point gap. Among younger respondents, 67% of Republicans and 65% of Democrats reported favorable views of Judaism, compared with 80% of both older Republicans and older Democrats.

Younger Americans Have Less Favorable Views of Jews and Judaism Than Older Americans and More Favorable Views of Muslims and Islam Than Older Americans

Q. What is your attitude about each of the following?



Source: University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll fielded with SSRS July 20 to July 26, 2026, among 1,206 US adults with a margin of error of +/- 3 percentage points.


Our polling shows a significant increase in the share of Republicans, younger and older, expressing unfavorable views of both Muslims and Islam, while Democrats show a small increase in unfavorable views of Muslims and a decrease in unfavorable views of Islam. In 2024, 20% of Democrats had an unfavorable attitude toward Muslims; that figure increased to 23% in the latest poll. Among young Democrats, unfavorable views increased from 15% to 21%, while among older Democrats they increased from 22% to 24%. Meanwhile, in 2024, 54% of Republicans had unfavorable views of Muslims, increasing to 67% in the latest poll—a 13-percentage-point increase. Among older Republicans, unfavorable views increased from 58% to 71%. Even among young Republicans, who generally have higher favorability toward Muslims and Islam than their older counterparts, unfavorable views rose sharply, from 33% in 2024 to 49% in 2026.

Republicans’ views of Islam became even more unfavorable than their views of Muslims. In 2024, 67% of Republicans reported unfavorable views of Islam, increasing by 14

percentage points to 81% in 2026. During the same period, unfavorable views of Islam increased by 12 percentage points among older Republicans, from 70% to 82%, and by 25 percentage points among younger Republicans, from 51% to 76%.

Sharp Rise in Republicans With Unfavorable Views of Muslims and Islam

Q. What is your attitude about each of the following?




Source: University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll fielded with SSRS July 20 to July 26, 2026, among 1,206 US adults with a margin of error of +/- 3 percentage points.

Unfavorable attitudes toward Jews rose most sharply among young Republicans, from 11% in 2024 to 28% in our latest poll, a 17-percentage-point increase. Young Democrats' unfavorable views toward Jews also rose during this period from 17% to 27%, a 10-percentage-point increase. Meanwhile, older Republicans' unfavorable views of Jews increased by only 4 percentage points, and older Democrats' views increased by 1 percentage point. Interestingly, unfavorable views of Judaism increased notably among Republicans overall, from 13% to 23%. The increase was 8 percentage points among older Republicans, from 12% to 20%, and 12 percentage points among younger Republicans, from 21% to 33%. Democrats' unfavorable views toward Judaism decreased between 2024 and 2025, from 26% to 21%, before increasing again to 25% in 2026. Among younger Democrats, 36% had unfavorable views of Judaism in 2024, falling to 25% in 2025, before rising to 35% in 2026. Older Democrats showed little change with unfavorable views of Judaism shifting from 22% in 2024 to 21% in 2026.

Increase in Unfavorable Views of Jews Fueled by Younger Democrats and Republicans

Q. What is your attitude about each of the following?



Source: University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll fielded with SSRS July 20 to July 26, 2026, among 1,206 US adults with a margin of error of +/- 3 percentage points.

Favorability toward Jews, Judaism, Muslims, and Islam is closely tied to whether respondents perceive more prejudice against each group. Among respondents with favorable views of Jews, 58% said there is more prejudice against Jewish Americans, compared with 35% of those with unfavorable views, a 23-percentage-point gap. Those with unfavorable views of Jews were also twice as likely as those with favorable views to say there is less prejudice against Jewish Americans (21% versus 10%). A similar but smaller pattern emerged for favorability toward Judaism: 57% of those with favorable views of Judaism perceived more prejudice against Jewish Americans, compared with 44% of those with unfavorable views. The same relationship holds for Muslims and Islam: 60% of respondents with favorable views of Muslims said there is more prejudice against Muslim Americans, compared with 45% of those with unfavorable views, while 58% of those with favorable views of Islam said the same, compared with 50% of those with unfavorable views.

Conversely, respondents who perceive more prejudice against Jewish and Muslim Americans are considerably more likely to hold favorable views of each group. Among those who said there is more prejudice against Jewish Americans, 87% held favorable views of Jews and 77% held favorable views of Judaism, compared with 65% and 57%, respectively, of those who said there is less prejudice. Similarly, among those who said

there is more prejudice against Muslim Americans, 64% held favorable views of Muslims, compared with 42% of those who said there is less prejudice. However, views of Islam remained divided even among those who perceive rising prejudice. Among respondents who said there is more prejudice against Muslim Americans, 47% held favorable views of Islam, while 53% held unfavorable views. Among those who said there is less prejudice against Muslim Americans, 29% had favorable views of Islam.

Tracking Perceptions of Incidents of Prejudice Toward Jews and Muslims, 2022–2026

We asked respondents, “Compared to 5 years ago and based on your own experience, including interactions with others, how much racial, ethnic, or religious prejudice (such as statements that reveal prejudice against a person because of their race, ethnicity, or religion), if any, would you say exists against each of the following groups in the U.S. today?” Among the racial, ethnic, and religious groups included in the survey, respondents most commonly identified Muslims and Jews as facing increased prejudice.


A majority of respondents (53%) said there is more prejudice against Muslim Americans and Jewish Americans today than five years ago. However, partisan differences emerge in perceptions of prejudice toward Muslims: Democrats are more likely than Republicans to perceive increased prejudice. By contrast, perceptions of increased prejudice toward Jewish Americans are identical among the two groups. Forty-five percent of Republicans and 64% of Democrats said there is more prejudice against Muslim Americans, while 57% of both Republicans and Democrats said there is more prejudice against Jewish Americans today.

We have tracked perceptions of prejudice toward Jews and Muslims in the United States since May 2022 and have seen an overall increase in the share of respondents who perceive more prejudice today than five years ago, with a particularly notable increase among Republicans. Perceived prejudice toward Muslim Americans increased by 8 percentage points, from 45% in 2022 to 53% today. Among Democrats, the share who said there was more prejudice remained stable at 64%, while among Republicans it increased by 21 percentage points, from 24% to 45%.

Perceived prejudice toward Jewish Americans increased by 7 percentage points over the same period, from 46% in 2022 to 53% in 2026. In 2022, 46% of Republicans and 50% of Democrats said there was more prejudice against Jewish Americans. Today, the same share of Republicans and Democrats (57%) hold that view.

Majority of Americans Perceive Rising Prejudice Against Muslims and Jews

Q. Compared to 5 years ago and based on your own experience, including interactions with others, how much racial/ethnic/religious prejudice (such as statements that reveal prejudice against a person because of their race, ethnicity, or religion), if any, would you say exists against each of the following groups in the U.S. today?



Source: University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll fielded with SSRS July 20 to July 26, 2026, among 1,206 US adults with a margin of error of +/- 3 percentage points.

Measuring Opposition to Muslim and Jewish Presidential Candidates

We asked respondents whether they would vote for a Muslim presidential candidate or a Jewish presidential candidate, assuming they agreed with that candidate on the issues important to them. Respondents were almost twice as likely to say they would vote for a Jewish presidential candidate (60%) as for a Muslim presidential candidate (35%). Sixty-five percent of both Republicans and Democrats said they would vote for a Jewish candidate. However, a majority of Democrats (57%) and only 12% of Republicans said they would vote for a Muslim candidate.

The partisan gap is even more pronounced among those who said they would *not* vote for a Muslim candidate. Forty-three percent of respondents said they would not vote for a Muslim presidential candidate, including 72% of Republicans and 18% of Democrats, a 54-percentage-point difference. Meanwhile, 20% of respondents said they would not vote for a Jewish presidential candidate, including 16% of Republicans and 15% of Democrats.


Age differences within parties also emerge. Younger Republicans are less opposed to Muslim presidential candidates but more opposed to Jewish presidential candidates than older Republicans. While 75% of Republicans ages 35 and older said they would not vote for a Muslim presidential candidate, 61% of younger Republicans said the

same. Among Democrats, 20% of those ages 35 and older said they would not vote for a Muslim candidate, compared with 13% of younger Democrats.

The pattern is reversed for Jewish presidential candidates among Republicans: 23% of younger Republicans said they would not vote for a Jewish candidate, compared with 15% of Republicans ages 35 and older. Among Democrats, 18% of younger respondents said they would not vote for a Jewish candidate, compared with 14% of those ages 35 and older. Interestingly, younger independents were more opposed than older independents to voting for either Muslim or Jewish presidential candidates.

Younger Republicans Less Opposed to Muslim Candidates Than Older Republicans, but More Opposed to Jewish Candidates

Q. Assuming that you agree with the general positions of the presidential candidates on issues that are important to you, would you vote for that candidate if he/she were:




Source: University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll fielded with SSRS July 20 to July 26, 2026, among 1,206 US adults with a margin of error of +/- 3 percentage points.

Over the last ten years, we have observed an increase in the share of respondents who say they would not vote for a Muslim presidential candidate or a Jewish presidential candidate. Opposition to Muslim candidates increased by 12 percentage points overall, from 31% in 2016 to 43% in 2026, but the increase was particularly pronounced among Republicans, with opposition rising 21 percentage points, from 51% in 2016 to 72% in 2026. Among Democrats, opposition increased from 13% in 2016 to 18% in 2026. Opposition to Jewish presidential candidates also increased over the same period, rising 13 percentage points overall, from 7% in 2016 to 20% in 2026. Among Republicans, the share saying they would not vote for a Jewish candidate increased from 10% to 16%, while among Democrats it increased from 4% to 15%.

Opposition to Muslim and Jewish Presidential Candidates Increases Over the Last Decade, but Opposition Remains Considerably Higher to Muslim Candidates

Q. Assuming that you agree with the general positions of the presidential candidates on issues that are important to you, would you vote for that candidate if he/she were:




Source: University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll fielded with SSRS July 20 to July 26, 2026, among 1,206 US adults with a margin of error of +/- 3 percentage points.

While opposition has increased toward both Muslim and Jewish presidential candidates, the increase has been particularly pronounced among younger respondents in opposition to Jewish candidates. Over the past ten years, the share of respondents under 35 who said they would not vote for a Jewish presidential candidate increased by 18 percentage points, from 10% to 28%. Among respondents ages 35 and older, opposition increased by 10 percentage points, from 6% to 16%.

The pattern differs for Muslim presidential candidates. Respondents ages 35 and older remain more opposed to Muslim candidates than younger respondents, although opposition has increased in both age groups since June 2016. Among respondents ages 35 and older, opposition increased by 9 percentage points, from 36% to 45%. Among respondents under 35, opposition increased by 14 percentage points, from 21% to 35%.

Opposition to Jewish Presidential Candidates Highest Among Younger Americans

Q. Assuming that you agree with the general positions of the presidential candidates on issues that are important to you, would you vote for that candidate if he/she were:




Source: University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll fielded with SSRS July 20 to July 26, 2026, among 1,206 US adults with a margin of error of +/- 3 percentage points.

Notably, over the past three years, opposition to a Muslim presidential candidate increased by nearly 20 percentage points among young Republicans, from 42% to 61%. Among young Democrats, opposition to Muslim candidates remained relatively stable at around 13%, while among young independents, opposition increased from 33% in 2024 to 39% in 2026.

During the same period, opposition among young Republicans to a Jewish presidential candidate increased from 13% in 2024 to 31% in 2025 before declining to 23% in 2026. As with Muslim candidates, opposition among young Democrats to a Jewish candidate remained relatively stable, ranging from 16% to 18%. Among young independents, however, opposition increased from 22% to 34%.

Increased Opposition to Jewish and Muslim Presidential Candidates Mostly Driven by Young Republicans and Independents

Q. Assuming that you agree with the general positions of the presidential candidates on issues that are important to you, would you vote for that candidate if he/she were:



Source: University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll fielded with SSRS July 20 to July 26, 2026, among 1,206 US adults with a margin of error of +/- 3 percentage points.


Perceptions of Contributions of Muslims and Jews to American Society

A plurality of respondents (32%) said Muslim Americans strengthen American society, including 47% of Democrats compared with 16% of Republicans, while 30% said they weaken American society, including 59% of Republicans and just 9% of Democrats. Sixteen percent of respondents said Muslim Americans have no impact on American society, including 11% of Republicans and 19% of Democrats, while 22% said they did not know, including 15% of Republicans and 25% of Democrats.

Views of Jewish Americans were considerably more favorable. Forty-seven percent of respondents said Jewish Americans strengthen American society, including a majority of both Republicans (52%) and Democrats (53%). Ten percent said Jewish Americans weaken American society, including 8% of Republicans and 9% of Democrats. Twenty percent said Jewish Americans have no impact on American society, including 22% of Republicans and 16% of Democrats, while 23% said they did not know, including 17% of Republicans and 22% of Democrats.

Significantly More Respondents Say Jewish Americans Strengthen American Society Than Say Jewish Americans Weaken It, While Respondents Are Split on Muslim Americans

Q. Would you say that, in general, the number of [...] strengthen or weaken American society?




Source: University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll fielded with SSRS July 20 to July 26, 2026, among 1,206 US adults with a margin of error of +/- 3 percentage points.

Since May 2022, we have observed a decline in the share of respondents who say that Jewish or Muslim Americans strengthen American society. For Jewish Americans, the overall share fell 12 percentage points, from 59% in May 2022 to 47% in 2026. Among Democrats, 71% said Jewish Americans strengthen American society in May 2022, falling to a low of 50% in January 2024. Over the last year, the share of Democrats who said the same declined 5 percentage points, from 58% to 53%. By comparison, the share of Republicans who said Jewish Americans strengthen American society has remained relatively stable, increasing slightly from 49% in 2022 to 52% in 2026.

There has been an overall decline in the share of respondents who say Muslim Americans strengthen American society, although the partisan patterns have differed. In 2022, 44% of respondents said Muslim Americans strengthen American society, including 21% of Republicans and two-thirds of Democrats. By 2026, that share had fallen to 32%, with 47% of Democrats and 16% of Republicans saying Muslim Americans strengthen American society. Thus, while the overall share has declined since 2022, the current partisan gap reflects substantially more favorable views among Democrats than Republicans.

Sharp Decline Since 2022 in the Share of Respondents Who Say Jewish and Muslim Americans Strengthen American Society

Q. Would you say that, in general, the number of [...] strengthens or weakens American society?



III. Prejudice Toward Other Racial, Religious, and Ethnic Groups

We asked respondents whether Asian, Latino, Christian, Black, White, Jewish, and Muslim Americans strengthen or weaken American society. Overall, a majority said that Asian (57%), Latino (56%), Christian (53%), Black (51%), and White (51%) Americans strengthen American society. By comparison, 47% said Jewish Americans strengthen American society, while only 32% said the same of Muslim Americans. Meanwhile, 30% said Muslim Americans weaken American society, the highest share for any of the racial, ethnic, or religious groups included in the question.


Partisan differences were particularly pronounced in views of White and Christian Americans. Republicans were substantially more likely than Democrats to say White (68% vs. 38%) and Christian (74% vs. 36%) Americans strengthen American society. Conversely, roughly one-quarter of Democrats said White (27%) and Christian (29%) Americans weaken American society, compared with just 3% and 2% of Republicans, respectively. The pattern was reversed for Black and Latino Americans. Nearly two-thirds of Democrats said Black (64%) and Latino (65%) Americans strengthen American society, compared with 41% and 50% of Republicans, respectively. Republicans were

more likely to say Black (23%) and Latino (14%) Americans weaken American society than were Democrats (7% and 5%, respectively).

Views of Asian Americans showed the greatest partisan agreement. A majority of both Democrats (64%) and Republicans (56%) said Asian Americans strengthen American society, while few in either party said they weaken it (4% and 6%, respectively).

More Respondents View Muslim Americans as Weakening American Society Than Any Other Racial, Ethnic, or Religious Group

Q. Would you say that, in general, the number of:



Source: University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll fielded with SSRS July 20 to July 26, 2026, among 1,206 US adults with a margin of error of +/- 3 percentage points.


We probed perceptions of incidents of prejudice among the same set of racial, religious, and ethnic groups and found that nearly half of respondents (48%) said there is more prejudice against Latino Americans today than five years ago, although views differed sharply by party. Twenty-seven percent of Republicans said there is more prejudice against Latino Americans, compared with 69% of Democrats, a 42-percentage-point difference. A similar partisan divide emerged regarding Black Americans: while 41% of respondents overall said there is more prejudice against Black Americans, there is a 49-percentage-point difference between Democrats (65%) and Republicans (16%) who said the same.

Respondents were more divided in their perception of prejudice against White and Christian Americans. Thirty-five percent said there is more prejudice against White Americans, including a majority of Republicans (56%) but only 16% of Democrats. Similarly, 34% said there is more prejudice against Christian Americans, including 51% of Republicans and 19% of Democrats. About one-third of respondents (34%) said there is more prejudice against Asian Americans, including 23% of Republicans and 47% of Democrats. Respondents also differed sharply over whether prejudice against Black Americans had decreased. Twenty-two percent said there is less prejudice against Black

Americans today than five years ago, including 41% of Republicans but just 7% of Democrats—a 34-percentage-point partisan gap.

Respondents Say Muslim and Jewish Americans Face More Rising Prejudice Than Any Other Group

Q. Compared to 5 years ago and based on your own experience, including interactions with others, how much racial/ethnic/religious prejudice (such as statements that reveal prejudice against a person because of their race, ethnicity, or religion), if any, would you say exists against each of the following groups in the U.S. today?



Source: University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll fielded with SSRS July 20 to July 26, 2026, among 1,206 US adults with a margin of error of +/- 3 percentage points.

Perceived prejudice toward Latino Americans increased between 2022 and 2025 before easing somewhat in the latest survey. In 2022, 42% of respondents said Latino Americans experienced more prejudice, including 61% of Democrats and 23% of Republicans. By 2025, that share had risen to 55%, including 78% of Democrats and 32% of Republicans. In the latest survey, 48% of respondents said Latino Americans experienced more prejudice, including 69% of Democrats and 27% of Republicans.


Perceived prejudice toward Black Americans declined somewhat over the same period. In 2022, 46% of respondents—including 69% of Democrats and 22% of Republicans—said there was more prejudice against Black Americans. In 2026, that share declined to 41% overall, including 65% of Democrats and 16% of Republicans.

Perceptions of prejudice toward White and Christian Americans also declined modestly between 2022 and 2026. The share who said there is more prejudice against White Americans fell 5 percentage points, from 40% to 35%, including a 13-percentage-point decline among Republicans, from 69% to 56%. Similarly, the share who said there is more prejudice against Christian Americans fell 2 percentage points, from 36% to 34%, including a 10-percentage-point decline among Republicans, from 61% to 51%.

The largest change occurred in perceptions of prejudice toward Asian Americans. In 2022, 59% of respondents said there was more prejudice against Asian Americans, compared with 34% in 2026—a 25-percentage-point decline. Among Democrats, the share fell from 73% to 47%, while among Republicans it declined from 45% to 23%.

Since 2022, Latino Americans Are the Only Group Besides Muslim and Jewish Americans for Which an Increasing Share of Respondents Say There Is More Prejudice

Q. Compared to 5 years ago and based on your own experience, including interactions with others, how much racial/ethnic/religious prejudice (such as statements that reveal prejudice against a person because of their race, ethnicity, or religion), if any, would you say exists against each of the following groups in the U.S. today?



Source: University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll fielded with SSRS July 20 to July 26, 2026, among 1,206 US adults with a margin of error of +/- 3 percentage points.


We also examined willingness to vote for presidential candidates of different religious backgrounds. A majority of respondents said they would vote for a candidate who was Catholic (70%), Jewish (60%), Evangelical Christian (57%), or Mainline Protestant (55%). Catholic candidates received the highest overall level of support, including 80% of Republicans and 72% of Democrats. Among Republicans, Evangelical Christians were

the second most accepted religious group, with 79% saying they would vote for an Evangelical Christian candidate, compared with 45% of Democrats who said the same.

The strongest opposition was to Muslim (43%), atheist (37%), and Hindu (32%) presidential candidates. Fifty-eight percent of Republicans said they would not vote for an atheist candidate, compared with 26% of Democrats. Nearly half of Republicans said they would not vote for a Hindu (49%) or Buddhist (48%) candidate, while 16% of Democrats said they would not vote for a Hindu or Buddhist candidate. Among Democrats, nearly one-third said they would not vote for an Evangelical Christian candidate, compared with just 6% of Republicans.

Respondents Have the Least Opposition to Catholic and Jewish Presidential Candidates and the Most Opposition to Muslim and Atheist Presidential Candidates

Q. Assuming that you agree with the general positions of the presidential candidates on issues that are important to you, would you vote for that candidate if he/she were:




Source: University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll fielded with SSRS July 20 to July 26, 2026, among 1,206 US adults with a margin of error of +/- 3 percentage points.

Since July 2024, we have observed an increase in the share of respondents who say they would not vote for a presidential candidate who shares their views on major issues but is Muslim, atheist, Hindu, Buddhist, agnostic, Jewish, Mainline Protestant, or Catholic. The only groups for which we did not observe an increase in opposition were Mormons and Evangelical Christians.

Since 2024, Opposition Increased Most Toward Muslim, Hindu, and Jewish Presidential Candidates


Q. Assuming that you agree with the general positions of the presidential candidates on issues that are important to you, would you vote for that candidate if he/she were:



We found that much of the rising opposition toward presidential candidates was driven by Republicans. Opposition to Hindu candidates increased 7 percentage points overall, from 25% in 2024 to 32% in 2026, while opposition among Republicans rose 17 percentage points, from 32% to 49%. Similarly, the share of respondents who said they would not vote for a Buddhist candidate increased 4 percentage points overall, from 26% in 2024 to 30% in 2026. Among Republicans, opposition increased 13 percentage points, from 35% to 48%. Opposition to agnostic candidates increased 3 percentage points overall, from 25% to 28%, while among Republicans it increased 10 percentage points, from 32% to 42%. Among Democrats, the largest increase in opposition was to Jewish candidates, with opposition rising from 10% to 15%. By comparison, opposition to Mormon, Evangelical Christian, and Catholic candidates remained relatively stable, with 31%, 20%, and 12% of respondents, respectively, saying they would not vote for candidates from those religious groups.

Opposition to Most Presidential Candidates Has Increased Since 2024, Particularly Among Republicans

Q. Assuming that you agree with the general positions of the presidential candidates on issues that are important to you, would you vote for that candidate if he/she were:



Source: University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll fielded with SSRS July 20 to July 26, 2026, among 1,206 US adults with a margin of error of +/- 3 percentage points.

IV. Trends in U.S. Public Attitudes Toward Antisemitism, 2022-2026


We asked respondents whether attitudes against Jews, Judaism, Zionism, and Israeli policies constitute antisemitism. Seventy percent of respondents said that attitudes against Jews are antisemitic—including 77% of Republicans, 71% of Democrats, and 68% of independents—while 10% said they are not antisemitic and 20% said they did not know. Republicans were the least uncertain about whether attitudes against Jews constitute antisemitism—14% of Republicans said they did not know compared to 20% of Democrats and independents. A majority of respondents (55%) said that attitudes against Judaism are antisemitic, with larger partisan differences: 64% of Republicans said attitudes against Judaism are antisemitic, while 54% of Democrats and 52% of independents said the same. Uncertainty was higher regarding whether attitudes against Judaism are antisemitic than whether attitudes against Jews are antisemitic: 27% of respondents—including 21% of Republicans, 30% of Democrats, and 26% of independents—said they do not know if attitudes against Judaism are antisemitic.

Republicans and Democrats are sharply divided over whether attitudes against Zionism and against Israeli policies are antisemitic. Overall, 30% of respondents said attitudes against Zionism constitute antisemitism, 29% said they do not, and a plurality of 41%

said they do not know. There is a 21-percentage-point difference between the share of Republicans (44%) who said attitudes against Zionism constitute antisemitism and the share of Democrats (23%) who said the same. Nearly one-third of Democrats (32%) and independents (33%) and 22% of Republicans said those attitudes do not constitute antisemitism. Almost half of Democrats (45%), 34% of Republicans, and 42% of independents said they were unsure. Regarding attitudes against Israeli policies, 29% of respondents said they constitute antisemitism, 42% said they do not, and 29% said they did not know. As with attitudes against Zionism, there is a 22-percentage-point gap between Republicans (45%) and Democrats (23%) who said attitudes against Israeli policies constitute antisemitism. A majority (51%) of independents, a plurality of Democrats (46%), and one-third of Republicans said attitudes against Israeli policies do not constitute antisemitism. Twenty-nine percent of respondents said they did not know.

While a Majority of Americans Say Attitudes Against Jews and Judaism Are Antisemitic, a Plurality Say Attitudes Against Israeli Policies Are Not

Q. Which of the following attitudes constitute antisemitism?



Source: University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll fielded with SSRS July 20 to July 26, 2026, among 1,206 US adults with a margin of error of +/- 3 percentage points.


Since we began tracking respondents' perceptions of which attitudes constitute antisemitism in June 2023, uncertainty has generally declined, although the share of respondents who were uncertain increased slightly in 2026, driven by rising uncertainty increasing among Democrats. In 2023, 31% of respondents said they did not know if attitudes against Jews constitute antisemitism, falling to a low of 18% in 2025, before rising slightly to 20% in 2026. Among Democrats, uncertainty rose 9 percentage points, from only 11% who said they did not know in 2025 to 20% who said the same in 2026. At the same time, uncertainty fell by 4 percentage points among Republicans (from 18% in 2025 to 14% in 2026). While uncertainty over whether attitudes against Judaism

constitute antisemitism remained stable over the year at 27%, we saw a significant partisan shift over the past year similar to that of uncertainty towards attitudes against Jews. We observed a 9-percentage-point increase, from 21% to 30%, in the share of Democrats who said they did not know if attitudes against Judaism constitute antisemitism. Among Republicans, uncertainty decreased 6 percentage points from 27% to 21%.

Over the last year, overall uncertainty about whether attitudes against Zionism constituted antisemitism remained relatively stable, increasing from 40% to 41%. Uncertainty about whether attitudes against Israeli policies constituted antisemitism increased from 27% to 29%. However, uncertainty among Democrats increased substantially on both questions. There was a 10-percentage-point increase in Democrats who said they did not know if attitudes against Zionism constitute antisemitism, from 35% to 45%. Still, Democrats have much less uncertainty than they did in 2023, when 62% said they did not know if attitudes against Zionism constitute antisemitism. Meanwhile, uncertainty among Republicans toward attitudes against Zionism continued to fall, from 41% to 34% in the last year. There was a 9-percentage-point increase in Democrats' uncertainty about whether attitudes against Israeli policies constitute antisemitism, from 22% to 31%, and a 5-percentage-point decrease in uncertainty among Republicans, from 27% to 22%, in the past year.

Since June 2023, Respondents Have Become Less Uncertain Over Which Attitudes Constitute Antisemitism

Q. Which of the following attitudes constitute antisemitism?




Since June 2023, including after October 7, 2023, respondents have increasingly said that attitudes against Jews, Judaism, Zionism, and Israeli policies constitute antisemitism, although with notable partisan differences. In June 2023, 58% of respondents said attitudes against Jews were antisemitic, including 56% of Republicans and 62% of Democrats. By the latest round of polling, the share of respondents who said the same had increased by 12 percentage points overall, by 21 percentage points among Republicans, and by 9 percentage points among Democrats. We saw a similar trend regarding attitudes against Judaism in that between June 2023 and July 2026, there has been an 8-percentage-point increase from 47% to 55% in those who said attitudes against Judaism constitute antisemitism. In 2023, 50% of Democrats said attitudes against Judaism are antisemitic, rising to 62% in 2025 before falling to 54% in July 2026. Meanwhile, there was an 18-percentage-point increase in Republicans who said the same.

Before October 7, 2023, a small minority of respondents said attitudes against Zionism and against Israeli policies constituted antisemitism. In June 2023, 15% of respondents, including 19% of Republicans and 12% of Democrats, said attitudes against Zionism are antisemitic. This rose sharply after October 7, 2023, and has continued to rise particularly among Republicans. Between 2023 and 2026, we saw a 15-percentage-point increase in respondents who considered attitudes against Zionism antisemitic, including a 25-percentage-point increase among Republicans and an 11-percentage-point increase among Democrats. Similarly, since 2023, the share of respondents who said attitudes against Israeli policies constitute antisemitism has increased by 14 percentage points overall, including a 24-percentage-point increase among Republicans and an 11-percentage-point increase among Democrats.

Republicans Increasingly Find Attitudes Against Jews, Judaism, Zionism, and Israeli Policies As Constituting Antisemitism

Q. Which of the following attitudes constitute antisemitism?

Those who said “Yes”




Source: University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll fielded with SSRS July 20 to July 26, 2026, among 1,206 US adults with a margin of error of +/- 3 percentage points.

The overall share of respondents who said attitudes against Jews and Judaism do not constitute antisemitism has changed little since June 2023. However, there is an overall increase in the share of respondents who said attitudes against Zionism (from 21% to 29%) and Israeli policies (from 37% to 42%) do not constitute antisemitism. Among Republicans, there was a 6-percentage-point increase, from 16% to 22%, who said attitudes against Zionism are not antisemitic, and a 5-percentage-point increase, from 28% to 33%, who said attitudes against Israeli policies are not antisemitic. There was an increase among Democrats who said attitudes against Zionism are not antisemitic from 25% in 2023, peaking at 44% in 2025, before falling to 32% in 2026. Similarly, 42% of Democrats in 2023 said attitudes against Israeli policies are not antisemitic, peaking in 2025 at 59%, before falling to 46% in 2026.

Since 2023, More Democrats Have Said Attitudes Against Zionism and Israeli Policies Are Not Antisemitic

Q. Which of the following attitudes constitute antisemitism?



Source: University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll fielded with SSRS July 20 to July 26, 2026, among 1,206 US adults with a margin of error of +/- 3 percentage points.

We asked respondents, “What is your impression of how labeling people antisemitic is used in the American political discourse?” with three categories using a scale ranging from “frequently” to “not at all”: “Used to describe people who are genuinely antisemitic”; “Used to delegitimize political opponents”; and “Used to delegitimize critics of Israel.” A plurality of respondents (36%) said labeling people antisemitic is sometimes used to describe people who are genuinely antisemitic. This included 40% of Democrats, 40% of independents, and 31% of Republicans. Twenty-seven percent of respondents, including a plurality of Republicans (38%), 23% of Democrats, and 24% of independents, said the label is frequently used to describe people who are genuinely antisemitic. Eighteen percent of respondents said the label was not often or not at all used in this way, including 15% of Republicans, 18% of Democrats, and 20% of independents. Nineteen percent of respondents said they did not know, including 16% of Republicans, 18% of Democrats, and 16% of independents.


A larger share of respondents said the term is used at least sometimes to delegitimize political opponents (70%) than said it is used at least sometimes to describe people who are genuinely antisemitic (63%). A plurality of respondents (37%)—including 38% of Republicans, 37% of Democrats, and 41% of independents—said labeling people antisemitic is used frequently to delegitimize political opponents. One third of respondents—including one third of Republicans, 38% of Democrats, and 30% of

independents—said the term is used sometimes to delegitimize political opponents. A combined 11% of respondents said the label “antisemitic” is used “not often” or “not at all” in that way, including 13% of Republicans, 8% of Democrats, and 13% of independents. Eighteen percent of respondents said they did not know.

Sixty-nine percent of respondents said the term antisemitic is used sometimes or frequently to delegitimize critics of Israel. Thirty-nine percent of respondents said the term is “frequently” used to delegitimize critics of Israel, including 32% of Republicans, a plurality of Democrats (45%), and a plurality of independents (42%). Thirty percent of respondents—including 37% of Republicans, 28% of Democrats, and 28% of independents—said it is used “sometimes” to delegitimize critics of Israel. Ten percent of respondents said the term is not often or not at all used in that way, and 21% of respondents said they did not know.

Plurality of Respondents Say Labeling People Antisemitic Is Used Frequently to Delegitimize Political Opponents and Critics of Israel

Q. What is your impression of how labeling people antisemitic is used in the American political discourse?



Source: University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll fielded with SSRS July 20 to July 26, 2026, among 1,206 US adults with a margin of error of +/- 3 percentage points.


After years of steady increases in the share of respondents who said the label “antisemitic” is frequently used to describe people who are genuinely antisemitic, delegitimize political opponents, or delegitimize critics of Israel, we observed a leveling off, or even a slight decrease, in 2026. Between 2023 and 2025, the share of respondents who said the term was frequently used to describe people who are genuinely antisemitic increased by 8 percentage points, from 19% to 27%. Between 2025 and 2026, the overall

share of respondents who said the label was frequently used in this way remained stable at 27%, although Republicans who said the same increased 5 percentage points, from 33% to 38%.

Between 2023 and 2025, there was an 18-percentage-point increase in the share of respondents who said the term “antisemitic” is used frequently to delegitimize political opponents, from 21% to 39%. In that same period, there was a 31-percentage-point increase in Democrats (18% to 49%), a 5-percentage-point increase in Republicans (25% to 30%), and a 22-percentage-point increase in independents (22% to 44%) who said the same. In the last year, we observed an 8-percentage-point increase in the share of Republicans who said the term was frequently used to delegitimize political opponents, from 30% to 38%. Also in the last year, we observed a 12-percentage-point decrease among Democrats, from 49% to 37%, and a 3-percentage-point decrease among independents, from 44% to 41%. Similarly, while the share of respondents between 2023 and 2025 who said the term was frequently used to delegitimize critics of Israel increased 21 percentage points (from 22% to 43%), we saw a decrease to 39% in our latest survey. The share of Republicans who said the term is frequently used in this way remained relatively stable over the last year, at about one-third. There was a 9-percentage-point drop in Democrats, and a 5-percentage-point drop in independents, who said the same in the last year.

Since 2023, Double-Digit Rise in Respondents Who Say the Label “Antisemitic” Is Used to Delegitimize Political Opponents and Critics of Israel

Q. What is your impression of how labeling people antisemitic is used in the American political discourse: Used to...



Source: University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll fielded with SSRS July 20 to July 26, 2026, among 1,206 US adults with a margin of error of +/- 3 percentage points.


Between June 2023 and July 2026, the share of respondents who said the label “antisemitic” is frequently used to describe people who are genuinely antisemitic increased by 8 percentage points overall, from 19% to 27%, a change driven largely by Republicans. The share of Republicans who said the label “antisemitic” is frequently used to describe genuine antisemitism increased 25 percentage points, from 13% to 38%. Among younger Republicans, it increased from 8% to 26%, and among older Republicans, from 15% to 40%. However, the share of Democrats who held this view declined from 28% to 23%. In June 2023, young Democrats were most likely to say the label is frequently used to describe people who are genuinely antisemitic (35%). By July 2026, they were least likely to say so, with the share falling 22 percentage points to 13%. Among Democrats ages 35 and older, the share remained relatively stable, moving from 25% in 2023 to 27% in 2026.

The share of respondents who said the label is frequently used to delegitimize political opponents increased across every partisan and age group. Overall, the share rose 16 percentage points, from 21% to 37%. Among Republicans, it increased from 25% to 38%. Among Democrats, it nearly doubled, from 18% to 37%. In the latest survey, between 35% and 38% of every group, including young Republicans (35%) and young Democrats (36%), said the label “antisemitic” is frequently used to delegitimize political opponents.

The most dramatic increase occurred among respondents who said the label is frequently used to delegitimize critics of Israel. Overall, the share rose 17 percentage points, from 22% to 39%. Among Republicans, it increased 11 percentage points from 22% to 33%, while among Democrats it increased 22 percentage points, from 23% to 45%. The increase was most pronounced among young Democrats, among whom the share rose 32 percentage points, from 18% in 2023 to 50% in 2026. Among Democrats ages 35 and older, the share increased from 25% to 43%, while among older Republicans, the share rose from 21% to 33%. Young Democrats are now nearly four times as likely to say the label is frequently used to delegitimize critics of Israel (50%) as to say it is frequently used to describe people who are genuinely antisemitic (13%).

Since 2023, Younger Democrats Show the Sharpest Increase in Those Who Say the Label “Antisemitic” Is Used Frequently to Delegitimize Critics of Israel

Q. What is your impression of how labeling people antisemitic is used in the American political discourse: Used to...



Source: University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll fielded with SSRS July 20 to July 26, 2026, among 1,206 US adults with a margin of error of +/- 3 percentage points.

Attitudes toward what constitutes antisemitism varied considerably according to respondents' favorability toward Jews. Among respondents with favorable views of Jews, 75% said attitudes against Jews constitute antisemitism, compared with 50% of those with unfavorable views. A similar divide emerged regarding attitudes against Judaism: 60% of those with favorable views toward Jews said attitudes against Judaism are antisemitic, compared with 38% of those with unfavorable views toward Jews. The pattern was less pronounced when respondents considered attitudes against Zionism and Israeli policies. Roughly one-third of respondents with favorable views toward Jews (32%) said attitudes against Zionism constitute antisemitism, compared with 23% of those with unfavorable views. Meanwhile, 29% of those with favorable views toward Jews and 27% of those with unfavorable views said attitudes against Israeli policies constitute antisemitism. Notably, uncertainty was higher among respondents with unfavorable views of Jews across all four categories, particularly regarding attitudes against Jews and Judaism.

Respondents' views on how the label “antisemitic” is used in American political discourse also varied by their favorability toward Jews. Among respondents with

favorable views of Jews, 29% said the label is frequently used to describe people who are genuinely antisemitic, compared with 19% of those with unfavorable views. An additional 37% of respondents with favorable views toward Jews and 30% of those with unfavorable views said it is “sometimes” used this way. Conversely, respondents with unfavorable views of Jews were more likely to say the label is not often (18% vs. 12%) or not at all (8% vs. 4%) used to describe genuine antisemitism.

Responses regarding whether the label is used to delegitimize critics of Israel showed a related trend. Among respondents with favorable views of Jews, 40% said the label is frequently used to delegitimize critics of Israel, compared with 33% of those with unfavorable views. An additional 31% and 24%, respectively, said it is “sometimes” used this way. Respondents with unfavorable views of Jews were also more likely to say the label is not often (10% vs. 6%) or not at all (7% vs. 3%) used to delegitimize critics of Israel. In both comparisons, respondents with unfavorable views of Jews were more likely to say they did not know how the label “antisemitic” is used.

V. Self-Censorship When Speaking About the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Compared With the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Since January 2024, our University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll has been tracking the public’s attitudes toward both the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Russia-Ukraine conflict, particularly on the need to self-censor when discussing the wars. We find that both conflicts generate increased self-censorship among the public, although it is far more prevalent when discussing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict than the Russia-Ukraine conflict. We have also seen a rise in those who self-censor specifically when criticizing U.S. policy toward both conflicts. American public perception has evolved in the context of the second Trump administration’s handling of relations with both Israel’s Bibi Netanyahu and Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelenskyy, as well as the Trump administration’s confrontations with universities over student protests and alleged incidents of antisemitism. The Middle East Scholar Barometer, co-directed by Shibley Telhami and Marc Lynch, probed similar questions, but among Middle East scholars, and found that nearly three-quarters of US-based scholars self-censor when discussing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in an academic or professional setting, and among those 81% self-censor on criticism of Israel.


We asked respondents, “When the [Israeli-Palestinian/Russia-Ukraine] conflict comes up in conversation outside your home, do you feel the need to be more careful than usual about what you say?” Among those who responded positively that they do feel they need to be careful, we asked which aspects they felt the need to be most careful discussing. For the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we offered the answer options: “Criticism of Palestinians,” “Criticism of Israelis,” “Criticism of U.S. policy,” and “Other.” For the

Russia-Ukraine conflict, we offered “Criticism of Russia,” “Criticism of Ukraine,” “Criticism of U.S. policy,” and “Other.” A plurality of respondents (42%) said they felt the need to be more careful when discussing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict outside their homes. Twenty-nine percent said “No,” while another 29% said “Does not apply.” Nearly half of Democrats (48%) said they self-censor when discussing the conflict, compared with 40% of Republicans and 42% of independents. Thirty-five percent of Republicans, one-quarter of Democrats, and 30% of independents said they do not self-censor. Another 25% of Republicans, 28% of Democrats, and 28% of independents said the question “does not apply” to them.


We also asked respondents whether they feel the need to be more careful than usual about what they say when the Russia-Ukraine conflict comes up in conversation outside their home. A majority of respondents (56%) said they do not feel the need to self-censor when discussing the Russia-Ukraine conflict, including 60% of Republicans, 55% of Democrats, and 57% of independents. Only about 17% of respondents said “Yes,” with little difference across partisan groups. Respondents were more than twice as likely to say they self-censor when discussing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (42%) as when discussing the Russia-Ukraine conflict (17%). Roughly the same share of respondents said the Israeli-Palestinian question “does not apply” to them (29%) said the same about the Russia-Ukraine conflict (28%).

Respondents Are More Than Twice As Likely To Self-Censor on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Compared to the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Q. When the Israeli-Palestinian conflict comes up in conversations outside your home, do you feel the need to be more careful than usual about what you say?



Q. When the Russia-Ukraine conflict comes up in conversations outside your home, do you feel the need to be more careful than usual about what you say?




Source: University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll fielded with SSRS July 20 to July 26, 2026, among 1,206 US adults with a margin of error of +/- 3 percentage points.

In January 2024, 30% of respondents said they felt the need to be more careful when discussing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict outside their homes, including 26% of Republicans, 38% of Democrats, and 35% of independents. Between January 2024 and July 2025, reported self-censorship increased substantially by 12 percentage points, from 30% to 42%. The largest increase occurred among Democrats, where the share rose by 14 percentage points, from 38% to 52%. Among Republicans, it increased from 26% to 36%, and among independents it increased from 35% to 42%. Between July 2025 and July 2026, overall levels of self-censorship remained unchanged at 42%. Among Democrats, however, the share saying they self-censor declined by 4 percentage points, from 52% to 48%, while among Republicans it increased by 4 percentage points, from 36% to 40%.

Increase in Self-Censorship on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Consistent Across Parties

Q. When the Israeli-Palestinian conflict comes up in conversations outside your home, do you feel the need to be more careful than usual about what you say?




Source: University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll fielded with SSRS July 20 to July 26, 2026, among 1,206 US adults with a margin of error of +/- 3 percentage points.

For the Russia-Ukraine conflict, self-censorship has also increased since 2024, although it remains much lower than reported self-censorship on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Overall, the share of respondents who said they self-censor when discussing the Russia-Ukraine conflict rose from 11% in January 2024 to 19% in July 2025 before declining 2 percentage points to 17% in the latest survey. Among Republicans, the share saying they self-censor increased by 12 percentage points between January 2024 and July 2025, from 11% to 23%, before falling to 16% in July 2026. Among Democrats, self-censorship increased more gradually, rising from 10% in January 2024 to 16% in July 2026. Among independents, the share saying they self-censor increased by 7 percentage points between January 2024 and July 2024, from 12% to 19%, before declining to 17% in both July 2025 and July 2026. Since January 2024, self-censorship has increased for discussions of both conflicts. However, respondents remain far more likely to say they self-censor when discussing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (42%) than the Russia-Ukraine conflict (17%).

Significant Increase in Republicans Self-Censoring on Russia-Ukraine Conflict Has Leveled Out

Q. When the Russia-Ukraine conflict comes up in conversations outside your home, do you feel the need to be more careful than usual about what you say?



Source: University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll fielded with SSRS July 20 to July 26, 2026, among 1,206 US adults with a margin of error of +/- 3 percentage points.

We asked respondents who said they self-censor what they feel the need to be most careful about when discussing either conflict. Among those who self-censor when discussing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the most common response was “Criticism of Israelis,” selected by about one-third of respondents overall, including 43% of Democrats, 42% of independents, and 16% of Republicans. Notably, we observed a partisan divide among those who self-censor toward criticism of Palestinians or criticism of Israelis. Twenty-one percent of respondents said they are most careful about “Criticism of Palestinians,” including a plurality of Republicans (39%), 21% of independents, and just 8% of Democrats. Twenty-eight percent of respondents said they are most careful about “Criticism of U.S. policy,” including 31% of Democrats, 24% of Republicans, and 24% of independents. Seventeen percent selected “Other,” including 21% of Republicans, 17% of Democrats, and 13% of independents.


Among respondents who self-censor when discussing the Russia-Ukraine conflict, a majority (51%) said they were most careful about criticizing U.S. policy, including 53% of Republicans, 56% of Democrats, and 44% of independents. We also saw a partisan divide over whether respondents are most careful about criticizing Russia (14%) or criticizing Ukraine (18%). Twenty percent of Republicans and 27% of independents said they are most careful about criticizing Ukraine, compared with just 7% of Democrats. By contrast, 21% of Democrats said they are most careful about criticizing Russia, compared with 14% of Republicans and 10% of independents. Seventeen percent selected “Other,” including 14% of Republicans, 16% of Democrats, and 19% of independents.

Among those who self-censor when discussing the Russia-Ukraine conflict, a majority said they are most careful about criticizing U.S. policy (51%). By contrast, respondents who self-censor when discussing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were more divided, with criticism of Israelis emerging as the most common concern. Still, more than one-quarter of respondents said criticism of U.S. policy was their greatest concern when discussing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

On the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Respondents Are Most Careful When Criticizing Israelis; on the Russia-Ukraine Conflict, Respondents Are Most Careful When Criticizing U.S. Policy


Q. What do you feel the need to be most careful about?

Among those who said “Yes” when asked “When the Israeli-Palestinian conflict comes up in conversations outside your home, do you feel the need to be more careful than usual about what you say?”



Q. What do you feel you need to be most careful about?

Among those who said “Yes” when asked “When the Russia-Ukraine conflict comes up in conversations outside your home, do you feel the need to be more careful than usual about what you say?”



Source: University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll fielded with SSRS July 20 to July 26, 2026, among 1,206 US adults with a margin of error of +/- 3 percentage points.


Since January 2024, the share of respondents who said they felt the need to be most careful about criticizing U.S. policy in discussions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has increased by 10 percentage points, from 18% to 28%. Among Democrats, the share increased from 18% to 31%, a 13-percentage-point increase. Among Republicans, it remained stable at 24%, despite a temporary increase to 29% in July 2025.

By contrast, the share who said they are most careful about criticizing Palestinians declined from 30% in January 2024 to 21% in July 2026. Among Democrats, the share fell from 19% to 8%, an 11-percentage-point decline. The share saying they were most careful about criticizing Israelis remained stable at 34% over the period and changed little across partisan groups.

Since 2024, Respondents Show Increased Concern Over Criticizing U.S. Policy on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Q. What do you feel the need to be most careful about?

Among those who said “Yes” when asked “When the Israeli-Palestinian conflict comes up in conversations outside your home, do you feel the need to be more careful than usual about what you say?”



We found that among those who said they self-censor on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, what they felt they needed to be most careful about criticizing was strongly correlated with their views on how the label “antisemitic” is used in American political discourse.


Thirty-nine percent of respondents who said they were most careful about criticizing Palestinians said the label “antisemitic” was frequently used to describe people who are genuinely antisemitic. However, only 26% of respondents who worry about criticizing Israelis and 27% who worry about criticizing U.S. policy said the term is frequently used in that way.

More than half (54%) of respondents who worry about criticizing Israelis said the term antisemitic is frequently used to delegitimize political opponents. Thirty-nine percent of respondents who worry about criticizing Palestinians and 37% of those who worry about criticizing U.S. policy said the same.

Nearly two-thirds of respondents who said they were most careful about criticizing Israelis said the term “antisemitic” was frequently used to delegitimize critics of Israel, and a plurality of those who said they were most careful about criticizing U.S. policy (38%) said the same. Only 34% of those who said they were most careful about criticizing Palestinians said the term was frequently used in this way.

A Majority of Respondents Who Are Careful About Criticizing Israelis Say the Label “Antisemitic” Is Frequently Used to Delegitimize Political Opponents and Critics of Israel

Q. What is your impression of how labeling people antisemitic is used in the American political discourse: Used to...



Source: University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll fielded with SSRS July 20 to July 26, 2026, among 1,206 US adults with a margin of error of +/- 3 percentage points.

For the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the share of respondents who said they were most careful about criticizing Russia declined slightly over time. Overall, it fell from 17% in January 2024 to 14% in July 2026, after peaking at 22% in July 2024. Among Democrats, the share increased from 14% to 27% between January 2024 and July 2024 before declining to 17% in July 2025 and then increasing to 21% in July 2026. Among Republicans, it increased from 11% to 20% between January 2024 and July 2024 before declining to 16% in July 2025 and 14% in July 2026. Among all respondents, the share saying they were most careful about criticizing Ukraine remained stable at 18% between January 2024 and July 2026. Among Republicans, however, it increased from 21% in January 2024 to 27% in July 2025 before declining to 20% in July 2026. Among Democrats, the share remained relatively stable at 7%, despite a temporary increase to 12% in July 2024.


The largest shift occurred among respondents who said they were most careful about criticizing U.S. policy. Overall, the share increased from one-third of respondents in January 2024 to 51% in July 2026, an increase of 18 percentage points. A majority of Democrats selected this response throughout the tracking period, with the share increasing from 50% to 56%. Among Republicans, it increased from 40% to 53%, a 13-percentage-point increase. The share selecting “Other” declined from 30% in January 2024 to 17% in July 2026.

Across both conflicts, respondents have become increasingly likely to say they are most careful about criticizing U.S. policy. At the same time, concerns about criticizing Palestinians and Russia have generally declined, while concerns about criticizing Israelis and Ukraine have remained relatively stable overall.

Sharp Increase Among Respondents Careful to Criticize U.S. Policy in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Q. What do you feel the need to be most careful about?

Among those who said “Yes” when asked “When the Russia-Ukraine conflict comes up in conversations outside your home, do you feel the need to be more careful than usual about what you say?”



Source: University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll fielded with SSRS July 20 to July 26, 2026, among 1,206 US adults with a margin of error of +/- 3 percentage points.

Leadership for the Critical Issues Poll



Shibley Telhami is the Director of the University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll. He is also the Anwar Sadat Professor for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland, College Park, and a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. Before coming to the University of Maryland, he taught at several universities, including the University of California at Berkeley, where he received his doctorate in political science. He has authored and edited numerous books, including one forthcoming book: *Peace Derailed: Obama, Trump, Biden, and the Decline of Diplomacy on Israel/Palestine, 2011-2022* (co-authored). His most recent book is a co-edited with contributions volume, *The One State Reality: What is Israel/Palestine?* which was published in March 2023 with Cornell University Press. He has advised every U.S. administration from George H.W. Bush to Barack Obama. Telhami was selected by the Carnegie Corporation of New York along with the New York Times as one of the "Great Immigrants" for 2013 and the Washingtonian Magazine listed him as one of the "Most Influential People on Foreign Affairs" in both 2022 and 2023. He is also the recipient of many awards including the University of Maryland's Distinguished Service Award and the University of Maryland's Honors College Outstanding Faculty Award.



Michael Hanmer is the Associate Director of the Critical Issues Poll. He is also the Director of the Center for Democracy and Civic Engagement and a professor in the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland. He earned his PhD in Political Science at the University of Michigan in 2004. He specializes in American politics with an emphasis on voting rights, civic engagement, public opinion, and political methodology. He is the author of *Discount Voting: Voter Registration Reforms and Their Effects* (Cambridge University Press, 2009) and the co-author of *Citizens of the World: Political Engagement and Policy Attitudes of Millennials across the Globe* (Oxford University Press, 2023) and *Voting Technology: The Not-So-Simple Act of Casting a Ballot* (Brookings Institution Press, 2008). His current research investigates the expansion of voting rights, the intersection of sports and politics, how mobilization influences the use of new voting methods, vote over-reporting, how individuals evaluate the responsiveness of political leaders, and question-wording effects in surveys.



Project Manager:
Karenn Sarney
Program Coordinator
& Executive Assistant,
Anwar Sadat Chair for
Peace and
Development



Analyst:
Badradin Mohammed
Doctoral Student in the
Department of Government
and Politics

Advisory Committee for the Critical Issues Poll



Antoine Banks is Professor and the Chair of the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland. His research interests include racial and ethnic politics, emotions, political psychology, and public opinion. His book, *Anger and Racial Politics: The Emotional Foundation of Racial Attitudes in America*, published by Cambridge University Press, explores the link between emotions and racial attitudes and the consequences it has for political preferences. His articles have appeared in journals such as *American Journal of Political Science*, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, *Political Behavior*, *Political Analysis*, and *Political Psychology*.



Ernesto Calvo is the Director of the Interdisciplinary Lab for Computational Social Science (iLCSS) and Professor of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland. His research centers on the study of comparative political institutions, social media, political representation, and social networks. His work lies at the intersection of big data, survey experiments, and institutions. He is the author of a number of books on comparative institutions and social media, including *Non-Policy Politics: Rich Voters, Poor Voters, and the Diversification of Electoral Strategies* (Cambridge University Press 2019) with María Victoria Murillo. Calvo has authored over 70 publications in the United States, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Europe. His research has been recognized by the American Political Science Association with the Lawrence Longley Award, the Luebbert Best Article Award, and the Michael Wallerstein Award.



Janelle Wong is Professor in the Departments of Government and Politics and American Studies and a core faculty member in the Asian American Studies Program. Wong authored two books, *Immigrants, Evangelicals and Politics in an Era of Demographic Change* (2018, Russell Sage Foundation), *Democracy's Promise: Immigrants and American Civic Institutions* (2006, University of Michigan Press) and co-author of two books on Asian American politics, including *Asian American Political Participation: Emerging Constituents and their Political Identities* (2011, Russell Sage Foundation), based on the first national, multilingual, multiethnic survey of Asian Americans. She was a co-principal investigator on the 2016 National Asian American Survey and on the 2020 Collaborative Multiracial Post-Election Survey (funded by a grant from the National Science Foundation). Wong is a Senior Researcher with AAPI Data.